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“Downsizing” the Chinese State:
Government Retrenchment in the 1990s
John P. Burns
ABSTRACT The Chinese Communist Party has maintained tight control over the
institutions and processes for creating and deleting official posts. The Party’s goal of
maintaining as many official positions as possible to preserve political patronage and
social stability conflicts with the need to curb administrative expenses and cut
government deficits. Aggregate data indicate that the downsizing campaigns of the
1990s have not been particularly successful and that staffing levels in local govern-
ment are probably to a large extent politically determined. A case study reveals that
some local governments may have officially downsized while expanding the total size
of public employment.
China’s system for controlling the creation and deletion of official posts
should have permitted the state to downsize itself during the government
re-organization campaigns of the 1990s. Yet because of the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP) needs for political patronage and social stabil-
ity, downsizing of core government has not been particularly successful.
Managing the retrenchment of China’s public non-profit institutions is the
responsibility of the State Commission for Public Sector Reform. This
Party organization approves re-organization plans for all central govern-
ment agencies, provincial governments and central-level service units
(shiye danwei) that lay down their organization structure (jigou), func-
tions (zhineng) and number of officially approved positions (bianzhi).
Downsizing is concerned with the latter issue – determining the number
of officially approved positions of an organization and actually carrying
out the staff reductions.
Previous research has sometimes confused the bianzhi system with the
nomenklatura system.1 As Brødsgaard points out, they are different.2 The
latter is a system for vetting personnel appointments and dismissals and
covers all leadership positions (from section chief up) including reserve
candidates for these positions, while the former is a system for creating
and deleting posts.3 The bianzhi refers to all positions that have been
1. See David Shambaugh, “The Chinese state in the post-Mao era,” in David Shambaugh
(ed.), The Modern Chinese State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.
173–75.
2. See Kjeld E. Brødsgaard, “Institutional reform and the bianzhi system in China,” The
China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 2002), p. 363.
3. On the nomenklatura system see John P. Burns (ed.), The Chinese Communist Party’s
Nomenklatura System (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), and John P. Burns, “Strengthening
central Party control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly,
No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 458–491.
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officially created. Especially at the most junior levels many positions on
the bianzhi are not on the Party’s nomenklatura: for example, not all
section members are on the reserve list for promotion to section chief.
Moreover, the bianzhi system is neither concerned with lists of officials
who might fill the positions nor mechanisms for making these appoint-
ments.
Previous research fails to examine the outcomes of downsizing at-
tempts and sometimes reports changes to bianzhi targets as though they
were actually achieved.4 This article points out the difficulties of trying to
determine whether the cuts have been made and, based on data from the
1993 to 1996 downsizing exercise, argues that generally the targeted cuts
have not been realized. Given the relatively widespread practice of many
poor local governments in China of employing more people than they
have positions (chaobian),5 we need to investigate the principles and
mechanisms on which bianzhi targets are established. Previous research
has neglected this important area. The article examines a number of
possible explanations of core staffing levels of local governments in the
1990s and presents a case study of downsizing in a district government
of a northern China city.
Chinese authorities attempted to downsize core government on many
occasions, twice in the 1990s.6 The most recent attempt was carried out
from 1998 to 2002 during which authorities announced that they had cut
approved administrative positions (xingzheng bianzhi) by 1.15 million
posts nation-wide.7 Authorities also reported that they had cut the number
of employees exceeding approved levels (chaobian) at prefectural, county
and township levels by 430,000 people. The government reportedly
re-organized the State Council into 29 ministry-level agencies down from
40, and abolished some 200 bureaus.8 Provincial-level agencies were
reportedly cut from 55 to 40, prefectural-level agencies from 45 to 35 and
county-level agencies from 28 to 18. Authorities reported that central and
provincial level party bureaucracies shed 20 per cent of their employees,
while the State Council reportedly shed 47.5 per cent. Officially, provin-
cial level government cut 48.2 per cent of employees, and prefectures,
counties and townships downsized by 19.4 per cent.9 We argue that cuts
of such magnitude should have had an impact on aggregate levels of
employment in core government. That they generally have not is an
indication that the claims for substantial downsizing from 1998 to 2002
should be treated with caution.
The CCP has maintained tight control over the process of creating and
deleting official government positions to preserve political patronage and
4. See Brødsgaard, “Institutional reform and the bianzhi system in China,” pp. 375–76.
5. Ibid. pp. 366–69.
6. Liu Zhifeng, Di qici geming: 1998 Zhongguo zhengfu jigou gaige beiwanglu (The
Seventh Revolution: the 1998 Reform of the Chinese Government) (Beijing: Jingji ribao
chubanshe, 1998).
7. Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 20 June, 2002.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
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social stability. First, the Party’s position in power depends on being able
to offer official employment to as many people as possible. Maintaining
control over the number of official positions allows the CCP to manage
the scope of political patronage. To maintain its position in power the
CCP must be able to reward its friends and supporters. The Party’s
system of controlling the bianzhi was developed during a time when
virtually all urban employment was official or state-sponsored. From the
mid-1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s the scope of the bianzhi
was accordingly very wide. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, with
economic reform the scope of the bianzhi has shrunk. Maintaining tight
control over the creation and deletion of the remaining official posts has,
thus, become a high priority for the Party.
Secondly, the Party’s position in power depends on maintaining social
stability which requires relatively high levels of growth with high rates of
employment. Economic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s has in-
creased unemployment, so that by the late 1990s at least 15.5 million
workers were unemployed in China’s cities, or about 7.5 per cent of the
urban workforce.10 From 1993 to 1999 the number of people employed by
state-owned enterprises fell from 76.4 million to 47.3 million.11 The
potential for the unemployed to oppose the regime cannot be exaggerated.
In spite of the CCP’s interest in establishing as many official positions
as possible, there are countervailing incentives for downsizing the state.
Government revenue as a percentage of GDP has declined in recent years,
from 25.7 per cent in 1980 to 10.7 per cent in 1995.12 It recovered
somewhat after that and in 1998–99 stood at 14 per cent of GDP, still
relatively low. As revenues have shrunk non-economic public employ-
ment has grown. From 1978 to 1996, for example, the number of
employees supported by the state (caizheng gongyang renyuan) increased
by 82.3 per cent to 36.73 million, an increase of from 2.1 to 3 per cent
of the entire population.13 Administrative expenses also grew from about
5.5 per cent of total government expenditure in 1980 to 13.1 per cent in
1996. The rapid growth of public employment contributed to government
deficits that grew from 1988 onwards. From 1990 to 1999 the deficit grew
from 14.6 billion yuan to 174.4 billion yuan.14 Government expenditure
grew faster than revenue in 1991, 1994, 1998 and 1999. This situation has
encouraged the government to rein in personnel costs.
10. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 9 October, 1997.
11. State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 1994 (Beijing: China Statistical
Publishing House, 1994), p. 90, and State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China
2000 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 2000), p. 124. The declining number of
SOE employees is offset by the growing number of unemployed and pensioners.
12. State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 2000 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 2000), p. 256.
13. Wang Luozhong, “Lun Zhongguo zhengfu xingzheng gaige de jiben jiazhi xuanze”
(“On basic value choices on administrative reform of China’s government”), Zhongguo
xingzheng guanli (China Public Administration), October 2000, p. 63.
14. China Statistical Yearbook 2000, p. 255.
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Institutions
Since 1949 the CCP has established specialized central agencies to
manage the bianzhi system, sometimes within the State Council and
sometimes within the Party.15 When in 1949 the government set up the
Committee for Investigating the Establishment of the State Administrat-
ive Council and Subordinate Units (Zhengwuyuan jiqi suoshu danwei
jigou bianzhi shencha weiyuanhui), the CCP signalled its intention to
manage the creation and deletion of posts in government agencies and
service units (shiye danwei). In 1950 authorities created the National
Establishment Committee (Quanguo bianzhi weiyuanhui) which extended
the scope of central bianzhi control to local levels. Day-to-day manage-
ment of the bianzhi was left to a General Office of the Committee, which
at that time (and unusually for post-1949 China) was located in the
Ministry of Finance. In 1952, however, the CCP transferred the General
Office to the Ministry of Personnel, indicating the importance the Party
placed on bianzhi work. Thus, since 1952 managing the bianzhi system
has been closely linked to the organization/personnel xitong.
From 1954 to 1956 during the period of institutionalizing the structure
of government,16 authorities established a separate State Council agency
to manage the bianzhi. In 1954 this took the form of a State Council
Establishment Investigation Committee (Guowuyuan bianzhi shencha
weiyuanhui), which in 1955 was replaced by the State Council Establish-
ment and Wages Committee and then in 1956 reverted to the State
Council Establishment Committee (Guowuyuan bianzhi weiyuanhui). The
brief change in 1955 may have been associated with the promulgation of
the new 30-grade uniform cadre wage system.17 In 1958 the General
Office of the State Council Establishment Committee was merged with
the State Council Personnel Bureau, continuing its close association with
organization/personnel work. Two years later the CCP established a
Central State Organs Streamlining Small Group (Zhongyang guojia
jiguan jingjian xiaozu) to oversee another attempt to downsize central-
level Party and government institutions. In 1962, bianzhi management
passed to a new body, the State Organs Establishment Small Group
(Guojia jiguan bianzhi xiaozu). In spite of these many institutional
changes, a core of Party officials who specialized in organization and
personnel work serviced these various committees and groups.
1963 marked a watershed in the institutionalization of the bianzhi
system when the National People’s Congress set up the State Establish-
ment Committee (SEC) (Guojia bianzhi weiyuanhui) under the State
Council, an institution that continued to function until 1970. In that year
the SEC was abolished and bianzhi control work was taken over by the
State Council General Office, presumably under the overall leadership of
15. Qian Qizhi, Jigou bianzhi guanli jiaocheng (Lectures on Organization Establishment
Management) (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1990), pp. 26–28.
16. See Harry Harding, Organizing China: the Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 65–86.
17. Ibid. p. 73.
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Premier Zhou Enlai. In 1978 the SEC was restored under the leadership
of the State Council Secretary General, replacing a series of ad hoc
arrangements that operated during the interim.18
In the post-Cultural Revolution era, bianzhi control passed to a 26-staff
bureau of the newly created Ministry of Labour and Personnel (set up in
1982), an arrangement that lasted until 1988, when authorities initiated a
new round of downsizing. The new campaign required an organization
that could stand above the ministries to enforce bianzhi discipline upon
them. As a result, in 1988 authorities centralized bianzhi control in an
agency outside the Ministry, named the State Commission on Public
Service Structure and Establishment Administration (Guojia jigou bian-
zhi weiyuanhui), where it remained until 1991 when the CCP placed it
directly under the Central Committee as the State Commission on Public
Sector Reform (SCPSR) (Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui).19 This
change was deemed necessary to extend the reach of bianzhi control (and,
thus, downsizing) to non-core government agencies (including the bu-
reaucracies of the Party, people’s congresses, the courts, the procuratorate
and so forth).
The evolution of the institutional arrangements for control of the
bianzhi reveals, first, the importance that the Party places on managing
this function. Indeed, by 1991 the CCP had taken direct control of bianzhi
work. Secondly, although the exact location of the function has changed
from time to time, since 1952 bianzhi work has been closely associated
with organization and personnel work, again a Party preoccupation.
Thirdly, the frequent changes to the location of bianzhi control appear to
have been associated with major downsizing or restructuring campaigns.
Through the changes authorities may have sought to signal to government
officials that the campaigns should be taken seriously. Thus they provided
the bianzhi control apparatus with a higher at least symbolic status that
lasted for the duration of the campaign. As shown above, the CCP has a
clear interest in maintaining as many official positions as possible, an
interest that runs directly counter to the need to downsize. Undoubtedly
this conflict has undermined the campaigns.
The SCPSR is usually headed by the Premier (Li Peng from 1991 to
1998 and Zhu Rongji from 1998 to the time of writing), an indication
18. In 1973, the State Council established an Organization and Establishment Investigation
Small Group (Jigou bianzhi shencha xiaozu), the membership of which consisted of “leading
comrades of relevant departments of the State Council.” In 1975 this was replaced by an
Establishment Small Group (Bianzhi xiaozu) within the State Council General Office. See
Qian Qizhi, Lectures on Organization Establishment Management, pp. 26–28.
19. Zhonggong zhongyang guowyuan guanyu chengli zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuan-
huide tongzhi” (“Notice of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the
Establishment of the SCPSR”), Zhongfa, No. 14 (1991), in China Local Government
Organization Reform Editorial Group (ed.), Zhongguo difang zhengfu jigou gaige (China
Local Government Organizational Reform) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1991), pp. 51–53.
The official English-language name of the agency from 1991 to 2000 was the State
Commission on Public Service Structure and Establishment Administration. In 2000 the
Commission adopted the new English-language name, State Commission for Public Sector
Reform. The Chinese language name has remained unchanged since 1991.
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of its apparent authority. Other members of the Commission include
senior Party and state officials charged with organization and personnel
work (see Table 1), the Party xitong headed in early 2002 by Hu Jintao.
Changes made to the composition of the Commission reflect changes
in the leadership but also undoubtedly reflect inner-Party politics. In
August 1994, Luo Gan was replaced by Li Guixian as a Vice-Chairman
of the Commission.20 Then in 1998 the number of Vice-Chairmen was cut
from two to one, a move that undoubtedly strengthened Hu Jintao’s
position. (Li Guixian, a prote´ge´ of Li Peng, may have held a Vice-Chair-
manship under Li Peng’s tenure in a bid to balance the influence of Hu
Jintao). Perhaps Zhang Qianjing was retained on the SCPSR for some
time even though he lost his position as Head of the Organization
Department as part of an accommodation to reduce resistance to the
promotion of Zeng Qinghong, a prote´ge´ of Jiang Zemin, to become the
new Head of the Organization Department. In 2000 Zhang Xuezhong
joined the Commission when he became Minister of Personnel, replacing
Song Defu who became Party secretary of Fujian province. Unusually, in
2001 Zhang Zhijian headed the General Office of the SCPSR, a post
usually reserved for the Minister of Personnel. Zhang came to the
position with many years of experience as a Vice-Minister of Personnel,21
however, and with close ties to the SCPSR.
The SCPSR (and its network of local commissions) is responsible for
determining the functions of, internal organization structure of, and
number of approved administrative positions (establishment or bianzhi) in
all government agencies and service units throughout the country. The
Commission’s authority also extends to approval of the internal organiza-
tion structure and establishment of the bureaucracies of the CCP, the
democratic parties and mass organizations, and to the bureaucracies of
the NPC, CPPCC, Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procu-
ratorate.22 In the 1980s and 1990s the three duties of the SCPSR have
been manifested in “three fixes” plans that all government agencies and
service units have prepared for SCPSR approval during each round of
administrative reform. These plans “fix” organization functions, institu-
tional structure and numbers of approved administrative positions within
each agency (ding zhineng, ding jigou, ding bianzhi). SCPSR approval is
required for each change of function, then, for a government agency
(such as the change to the functions of the People’s Bank of China that
made it the country’s central bank or the decision to set up the China
Securities Regulatory Commission, or the decision to corporatize the
Ministry of Electric Power). The SCPSR at the centre approves provin-
20. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu yanjiushi (ed.) Dang de zuzhi gongzuo dashiji
1993–1997 (Diary of Party Organization Work, 1993–1997) (Beijing: Dangjian duwu
chubanshe, 1999), p. 137.
21. He was also a Deputy Secretary of the Party core group (dangzu) in the Ministry of
Personnel.
22. “Notice of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the establishment of
the SCPSR,” pp. 51–53.
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cial level plans down to the level of bureau chief for onward transmission
to the CCP Central Committee and the State Council.23
The SCPSR differs considerably from administrative reform agencies
overseas. First, reflecting the one-party nature of China’s political system,
the State Commission is a creature of the CCP. The scope of its authority
is nominally very broad, for it includes not only the executive but the
legislature, the judiciary, the CCP itself and the eight official democratic
parties, mass organizations (such as the All China Federation of Trade
Unions) and service units, such as schools, hospitals and research insti-
tutes. Most administrative reform agencies overseas are established by
governments to manage reform that is much narrower in scope.
The nominally sweeping authority of the SCPSR is of relatively recent
origin. Prior to 1991 the Commission was attached to the State Council.
In 1988, although headed by Premier Li Peng (the Secretary General of
the State Council and the Minister of Personnel served as Deputy Heads),
it was staffed mostly by Vice-Ministers of State Planning, State Econ-
omic System Reform, Finance and Personnel, and a Deputy Secretary
General of the State Council.24 In 1991, the SCPSR was moved from the
State Council to the Party Central Committee and its authority strength-
ened. Although Li Peng continued to head the body, the position of
Deputy Head was upgraded by the appointment of Politburo member
Song Ping. The two previous Deputy Heads became ordinary members of
the Commission. To the other ordinary members were added senior
positions in the legislature, judiciary and the procuratorate.25 Finally, in
1993, as the authorities were gearing up for the 1993 administrative
reforms, the body was upgraded again. The number of ordinary Com-
mission members was cut from 13 to four and the vice-ministers were
replaced by more senior officials. The numbers were probably cut to
reduce the opportunities for government bureaus to plead for special
treatment. A smaller, more powerful and more cohesive Commission
should have been more effective.
A second characteristic of China’s administrative reform agency that
sets it apart from similar agencies overseas is the relatively weak position
played by the Ministry of Finance, even in the strengthened post-1993
line-up. In many countries, establishment matters, including the cost and
size of the civil service, are tightly controlled by Treasury officials. In
China, by contrast, control of establishment is vested in the CCP. The
Ministry of Finance plays a weak role, as it has done in other arenas as
well.26
23. Ibid. pp. 51–53.
24. “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu chengli guojia jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui de
tongzhi” (“Notice of the State Council General Office on the establishment of the SCPSR”),
Guobanfa, No. 27 (1988), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian
(Selection of Personnel Work Documents), Vol. 11 (Beijing: Xuefan chubanshe, 1989), pp.
611–12.
25. These positions were: Deputy Secretary General of the NPC Standing Committee;
Secretary General of the CPPCC; Head of the Discipline Group of the Supreme People’s
Court; and Deputy Head of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. See “Notice of the CCP
Central Committee and the State Council on the establishment of the SCPSR,” pp. 51–53.
26. David Bachman, “The Ministry of Finance and Chinese politics,” Pacific Affairs, No.
62 (1989), pp. 167–187.
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The day-to-day work of the SCPSR is carried out by a General Office
(GO), usually headed by the Minister of Personnel (the current incumbent
is a Zhang Zhijian, who holds ministerial rank (zhengbuji)). Deputy heads
of the GO include a Vice-Minister of Personnel, a Deputy Head of the CC
General Office, a Deputy Head of the State Council General Office, and
a full-time administrator with the rank of Vice-Minister (SCPSR). Under
the directorate are the General Bureau, and four other bureaus, one each
managing central-level organizations, local-level organizations, mass or-
ganizations and service units. Attached to the General Office are the
China Research Centre for Administrative Systems and Organizational
Reform (Zhongguo xingzheng tizhi yu jigou gaige yanjiu zhongxin), a
Logistics Service Centre, the offices of a publicly available monthly
magazine China Organization (Zhongguo jigou), and the Service Unit
Registration and Management Centre (Shiye danwei dengji guanli
zhongxin), which among other things is responsible for registering service
units of the State Council.27
The number of employees of the GO grew rapidly from about 50
people in 1991 to over 100 in 1997. In the 1998 restructuring, however,
the level of staffing was cut by about 30 per cent.28 In 1996, 73.4 per cent
of the GO’s staff had graduated from university. Of these, 20.3 per cent
had master’s degrees. Men outnumbered women by about 2.6 to 1. Nearly
half the employees were between 35 and 50 years old, while another 17
per cent were over 50.
Similar organizations have been established at provincial, prefectural
and county levels. Generally, the provincial Commissions are joint
party-state organizations, usually headed by the provincial governor. In
the case of Anhui province, for example, the Commission consisted of the
provincial governor, two vice-governors and two senior Party officials,
one of whom headed the Party Organization Department. In the 1993
reforms they formed the standing committee of an “organization reform
leading small group” set up in the province to supervise the drafting of
the province’s administrative reform plan, submit it to the SCPSR for
approval and supervise its implementation.29 Additional members of the
commission included the heads of the provincial bureaus of personnel and
finance, and the deputy head of the provincial economic system reform
commission. The head of the personnel bureau also headed the General
Office of the provincial Commission. In 1996 the GO employed 15
people, organized in two divisions, one each to handle administrative
agencies (such as government and Party organs) and service units. A
network of commissions links China’s counties, cities and provinces to
the SCPSR in Beijing. They all come under the administrative guidance
of the SCPSR.
27. SCPSR, Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui bangongshi (General Office of the State
Commission for Public Sector Reform) (n.p. n.d.).
28. Interviews, SCPSR, 18 May 1999. Interviews in 2001 indicated that the GO had 65
administrative positions and a total staff (including blue-collar workers) of about 100.
Interview, SCPSR, 25 July 2001.
29. Interviews, Hefei CPSR, 1994.
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Administrative Bianzhi Plans
The drafting of organizational reform plans in China is a top-down
exercise. The SCPSR drafts guidelines for organizational reform that are
discussed and approved by the Politburo and the State Council. Draft
plans for specific central-level agencies are produced by the agencies
themselves under the guidelines and in consultation with the SCPSR,
which must approve them. A strategic plan incorporating all the specific
proposals is then discussed by the Politburo and the State Council,
approved by the Central Committee, and finally approved by the National
People’s Congress.
Central policy for determining the structure of local government has
changed in recent years. Up until 1998, the SCPSR required provincial
and local governments to establish a specific number of agencies set out
on a list30 (see Table 2). Generally, provinces and first and second tier
cities (see below) were required to establish the most complete adminis-
trative machinery. Prefectures, counties and towns/townships were re-
quired to establish relatively fewer government offices. Tax offices, for
example, were only required at provincial level. According to bianzhi
regulations, each administrative level was required to establish a general
office, planning office, and offices to manage education, public security,
civil affairs, finance, agriculture, health, family planning, audit, statistics,
and industry and commerce. Local Party and government organs were
instructed to study the lists and carry out the instructions. Apart from the
mandatory agencies laid down by the SCPSR, each jurisdiction had
discretion about which other agencies to establish within the overall
establishment targets. The establishment of additional agencies formed
much of the basis of each jurisdiction’s “three fixes” plan and that was
approved by higher level commissions and ultimately by the SCPSR in
Beijing.
Authorities apparently relaxed these requirements in 1998 when the
government abolished “mandatory department lists.” According to an
authoritative source, “… central authorities no longer demand that a local
government establish specific departments to match those at a higher
level.”31 The revised policy urged local governments to be innovative as
they downsize and not to be seduced by departments at higher levels,
which undoubtedly prefer for administrative convenience and bureau-
cratic accountability to have their own departments duplicated at each
level. Local governments may also prefer these arrangements, however,
to facilitate communications and the transfer of (human and financial)
resources. Because following higher administrative levels on organiza-
tional matters is so entrenched, the new policy may have had little impact.
30. “Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui guanyu difang geji dangzheng jigou shezhi de
yijian” (“Opinion of the SCPSR on establishing local Party and government organs”),
Zhongbian, No. 4 (1993), in China Local Government Organizational Reform, pp. 72–74.
Central government officials apparently tried to do away with the list for some time.
31. Wang Zhenning, “Localities given decision-making power in administrative structural
reform,” Ta Kung Pau, 19 June 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999–0711, 19 June 1999.
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Table 2: Required Government Offices at each Administrative Level,
1993
Government Province Prefecture City (tiers City (tier County Town/
Dept. 1 and 2) 3) township
General X X X X X Xe
office
Planning X Xa X Xa Xa
Economic X X
and trade
Economic X X
system
reform
Education X Xb X Xb Xb Xd
Science and X X
technology
Nationality X X
affairs
Public X X X X X
security
State X
security
Civil X X X X X X
affairs
Justice X X
Finance X X X X X Xf
Personnel X Xc Xc Xc
Labour X Xc
Transport X X X
Construction X X X X
Agriculture X X X X X Xe
Trade X X
Culture X X
Health X X X X X
Family planning X X X X X Xd
Audit X X X X X
Statistics X X X X X
Industry X X X X X
and commerce
Tax X
Notes:
a Combined Planning and Economy Affairs Bureau.
b Combined Education and Science and Technology Bureau.
c May be established separately or merged.
d Combined Social Affairs Office, including Family Planning.
e Combined Party/Government Office
f Combined Finance and Economy Office
Source:
“Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui guanyu difang geji dangzheng jigou shezhi de
yijian” (“Opinion of the SCPSR on establishing local Party and government organs”),
Zhongbian, No. 4 (1993) in China Local Government Organization Reform Editorial Group
(ed.), Zhongguo difang zhengfu jigou gaige (China Local Government Organizational
Reform) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1995), pp. 72–74.
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It was specifically aimed at poorer areas that did not have the financial
capacity to support large governments. “In the case of poor and remote
border areas, the departmental line-up should be even simpler. In those
areas, departments should be as comprehensive as possible.”32 Still,
provincial level governments were urged to set up departments that
“roughly correspond to the structure of the State Council.”33
To help it determine the appropriate number of administrative posts for
each jurisdiction, the SCPSR has classified cities and counties into first,
second and third-tier jurisdictions based on a number of criteria, includ-
ing total population, total non-agricultural population, land area, urban
land area, number of administrative districts, the local budget income and
the total value of output. The SCPSR uses the criteria to evaluate the
appropriate size of each jurisdiction’s administrative bianzhi. The Com-
mission uses a similar method, based on fewer criteria (total population,
land area, total value of industrial and agricultural output, and the county
budget income) to classify counties, also into several tiers. Towns and
townships are classified based on population, land area, and total value of
agricultural and industrial production.34
The authorities then advise each municipality on the number of Party
and government agencies it should establish. In 1993, first-tier cities,
which were more populous and richer, were permitted to establish about
60 agencies; second-tier cities about 50 agencies; and third-tier cities,
which were less populous and less developed, about 40 agencies. Public
Sector Reform Commissions instructed each first and second-tier city to
establish a minimum of 22 specific agencies (see Table 2). Third-tier
cities were instructed to set up a minimum of 15 specific agencies. By
1998 the target number of agencies had been further reduced. Provincial
governments would retain from 30 to 40 agencies depending on their
level of development, with poorer areas establishing fewer departments/
bureaus. Beijing, Tianjian, Shanghai and Chongqing would retain about
46 bureaus. In first, second and third-tier cities, further cuts were also
mandated – and their target number of bureaus became 40, 30 and 20
respectively. Towns and townships, depending on size, were to establish
22, 18 and 14 departments as well. According to the government, when
implemented these cuts would enable local governments to cut their
payrolls in half.35
Central and Local Administrative Bianzhi Targets
Based on these principles and quotas, the SCPSR lays down adminis-
trative bianzhi targets for central and local governments (these exclude
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. “Guanyu yinfa shi, xian ji xiangzhen fenwei biaozhun de tongzhi” (“Notice on the
printing and distribution of city, county, town, and township classification criteria”),
Zhongbianban, No. 17 (1993), in China Local Government Organizational Reform, p. 75.
35. Wang Zhenning, “Localities given decision-making power in administrative structural
reform.”
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bianzhi targets for service units (shiye danwei). The targets laid down in
1990, 1993 and 1998 for selected central government agencies appear in
Table 3. They reveal, first, that from 1990 to 1998 there was a continuous
decline in the establishment of most central agencies. That is, by 1993
establishment had not crept back to 1990 levels, a problem that character-
ized most pre-1990 attempts to downsize.36 Indeed, the decline has been
remarkable with many agencies experiencing cuts of 50 per cent in 1998
over 1990 levels. The cuts have been the largest in those economic
ministries that became bureaus in 1998 (reaching 80 to 90 per cent). The
downsized bureaus were subsequently wound up and their functions
folded into the State Commission for Economics and Trade.37 Authorities
spared from savage downsizing some of the regulatory and supervisory
agencies, such as the State Administration of Audit. Still, cuts of from 21
to 55 per cent were registered for environmental protection, taxation and
statistics.
Interviews with officials in Beijing whose agencies were downsized
reveal that in some cases departments believed the cuts were too severe.
According to one official, many experienced division-level bureaucrats
were sacked in his ministry, which undermined the ability of the ministry
to function. New officials had to be trained to take over their duties, a
process that took time and resulted in substantial delays and near paral-
ysis in the summer of 2000. In another case, officials were asked to vote
on which of their colleagues should be required to leave to achieve the
targets. This resulted in the least competent (or popular?) colleagues
leaving the organization.38
The 1993 administrative bianzhi targets for China’s provinces appear
in Table 4. In the 1993 reforms, huge reductions in administrative
positions were planned for some provinces. For example, Shanxi, Shaanxi
and Shandong provinces were each supposed to reduce their overall
administrative establishment by over 40 per cent. Shanghai, on the other
hand, was set a target of only a 5 per cent reduction. A perusal of the
summaries of the “three fixes” plans for the provinces slated for the
largest reductions indicates that authorities hoped to achieve the targets
through such measures as abolishing whole levels of government (such as
prefectures). That was clearly the plan in Shandong province.39 In other
cases, however, how such large reductions were to be achieved is unclear
from the plans.
Administrative bianzhi targets for the 1998 local reforms have yet to be
published.40 Scattered information is available, however, and indicates
36. Wu Peilun, Woguo de zhengfu jigou gaige (Organizational Reform of China’s
Government) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1990).
37. See Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 18 September 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0918, 18
September 2000.
38. Interviews, Beijing, July 2000. These problems were apparently quite widespread,
indicating the seriousness of the cuts in 1999 and 2000 at the centre.
39. “Shandong sheng zhengfu jigou gaige” (“Shandong provincial government organiza-
tion reform, 1993”), in China Local Government Organizational Reform, p. 352.
40. Brødsgaard attempts to deduce the administrative and service unit bianzhi for provinces
for 1998 from the China Statistical Yearbook, but the figures are undoubtedly
incomplete. He excludes many categories of economic activity that would include service units.
See Table 3 in Brødsgaard, “Institutional reform and the bianzhi system in China,” p. 367.
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Table 4: Administrative Bianzhi Targets for Various Provinces, 1993
Before After Reduction Percentage
change
Beijing 82,048 56,640 25,408 31.0
Tianjin 69,008 50,155 18,853 27.3
Hebei 313,747 226,633 87,114 27.8
Shanxi 229,970 134,250 95,720 41.6
Inner 182,885 119,915 63,080 34.5
Mongolia
Liaoning 231,050 146,855 84,195 36.4
Jilin 113,234 92,410 20,824 18.4
Heilongjiang 216,043 146,240 69,803 32.4
Shanghai 55,921 53,050 2,871 5.1
Jiangsu 263,602 192,605 70,997 26.9
Zhejiang 208,275 144,755 63,520 30.5
Anhui 228,538 150,855 77,683 33.9
Fujian 151,563 101,070 50,493 33.3
Jiangxi 207,853 135,390 72,463 34.9
Shandong 419,274 231,850 187,424 44.7
Henan 382,285 232,800 149,485 39.1
Hubei 254,962 161,250 93,712 36.8
Hunan 330,740 202,380 128,360 38.8
Guangdong 314,142 226,900 87,242 27.8
Guangxi 212,173 132,673 79,500 37.5
Hainan 44,518 27,985 16,533 37.1
Sichuan 545,235 382,779 162,456 29.8
Guizhou 169,965 119,085 50,880 29.9
Yunan 251,381 177,040 74,341 29.6
Tibet 23,017 28,017  5,000 21.7
Shaanxi 245,379 138,500 106,879 43.6
Ganxu 117,636 91,798 25,838 22.0
Qinghai 40,395 29,179 11,218 27.7
Ningxia 34,427 23,248 11,179 32.5
Xinjiang 113,430 92,975 20,455 18.0
Note:
Administrative positions are “cadre” positions in government, political parties, mass
organizations and service units at town/township, county, city, prefecture and province
levels, aggregated for each province.
Source:
China Local Government Organization Reform Editorial Group (ed.), Zhongguo
difang zhengfu jigou gaige (China Local Government Organizational Reform)
(Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1995).
that Guangdong province, for example, plans to retain 41 departments
and agencies and to retrench 49.4 per cent of administrative positions at
provincial level. Fifteen per cent of bureau-level and 25 per cent of
division-level positions will be eliminated.41 Shanghai municipality plans
41. Zhongguo zhigou (China Organization), May 2000, p. 6.
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to cut the number of its departments from 56 to 43 and to cut administrat-
ive positions by 50 per cent.42 Beijing also plans to cut the number of its
departments to 45 and the number of its municipal-level administrative
positions by 50 per cent.43 These targets appear to be in line with the
approved policies. Whether they started in 1998 with the reduced number
of administrative positions that should have been achieved in 1993 (see
Table 4) is still not clear.
Although the SCPSR uses a specified set of criteria to determine the
administrative bianzhi of each jurisdiction, the relative weight given to
each indicator is unclear. Further, it seems likely that other criteria, such
as the strategic importance of the province, may also have been used.
Thus, in 1993 autonomous regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongo-
lia and Qinghai appeared to have unusually high numbers of approved
administrative positions compared to the total population (see Table 5).
Authorities may have authorized more administrative positions in these
regions for security reasons because of their relatively large national
minority populations. Beijing and Tianjin also have relatively large
administrative establishments, much larger than Shanghai’s, for example.
Why Tianjin’s establishment should be larger than Shanghai’s is unclear.
That political status is a consideration is explicitly mentioned in SCPSR
Document No. 1 (1994), which granted deputy provincial rank to 16
cities including Guangzhou and Shenzhen.44
Outcomes
Several unresolved questions are left: have the downsizing targets laid
down by the SCPSR actually been achieved? If not, why not? What
factors explain actual staffing levels?
Unfortunately, published statistics do not lend themselves to answering
these questions. They do not distinguish core-government employees
from non-core government employees. Rather, there are figures for the
number of “staff and workers” of an imprecisely defined category, guojia
jiguan (state or government agencies). For our purposes we take guojia
jiguan as a proxy for core-government.
If the personnel cuts have actually been carried out, we would expect
to see some decline in the number of employees of guojia jiguan. Yet
from 1993 to 2000 the number of “staff and workers” in these organiza-
tions has actually increased from 8.79 million to 10.2 million (see Table
6). Employment of “staff and workers” by Party agencies (dang-
zheng jiguan) (including the CCP) remained relatively stable, while the
42. Xingzheng yu renshi (Administration and Personnel), May 2000, p. 5.
43. Zhongguo jigou, March 2000, p. 9.
44. Other cities include Wuhan, Harbin, Shenyang, Chengdu, Nanjging, Xi’an,
Changchun, Jinan, Hangzhou, Chungqing, Dalian, Qingdao and Xiamen. The document
indicates that the SCPSR has the authority to make this determination, which is then approved
by the Party centre and the State Council. See “Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui guanyu
guangzhou deng shiliu shi xingzheng jibie wenti de tongzhi” (“SCPSR notice on the problem
of the administrative rank of Guangzhou and 16 other cities”), Zhongbian, No. 1 (1994), in
China Local Government Organizational Reform, p. 85.
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Table 5: Total Population and Local Administrative Bianzhi Targets,
1993
Population Post-reform Percentage
(million) Positions
Beijing 11.25 56,640 .50 (.73)
Tianjin 9.35 50,155 .54 (.74)
Hebei 63.88 226,633 .35 (.49)
Shanxi 30.45 134,250 .44 (.76)
Inner Mongolia 22.60 119,915 .53 (.81)
Liaoning 40.67 146,855 .36 (.57)
Jilin 25.74 92,410 .36 (.44)
Heilongjiang 36.72 146,240 .40 (.59)
Shanghai 13.56 53,050 .39 (.41)
Jiangsu 70.21 192,605 .27 (.38)
Zhejiang 42.94 144,755 .34 (.49)
Anhui 59.55 150,855 .25 (.38)
Fujian 31.83 101,070 .32 (.48)
Jiangxi 40.15 135,390 .34 (.52)
Shandong 86.71 231,850 .27 (.48)
Henan 90.27 232,800 .27 (.42)
Hubei 57.19 161,250 .28 (.45)
Hunan 63.55 202.380 .32 (.52)
Guangdong 66.89 226,900 .34 (.47)
Guangxi 44.93 132,673 .30 (.47)
Hainan 7.11 27,985 .39 (.63)
Sichuan 112.14 382,779 .34 (.49)
Guizhou 34.58 119,085 .34 (.49)
Yunan 39.39 177,040 .45 (.64)
Tibet 2.36 28,017 1.19 (.98)
Shaanxi 34.81 138,500 .40 (.70)
Gansu 23.78 91,798 .39 (.49)
Qinghai 4.74 29,179 .62 (.85)
Ningxia 5.04 23,248 .46 (.68)
Xinjiang 16.32 92,974 .57 (.70)
Note:
Administrative positions are “cadre” positions in government, political parties,
mass organizations and service units. The percentage of pre-reform established
positions compared to total population is in brackets.
Sources:
China Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1994 (China Statistical
Yearbook 1994) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1994), p. 60; China Local
Government Organizational Reform.
number of employees of “social organizations” (shehui tuanti), such as
trade unions and the women’s federation has declined dramatically,
plunging from about 1.5 million to 167,000 during the period. Only from
1993 to 1994 did the total number employed by all three types of official
organizations decline, going from 10.3 million to 10.17 million. The data
seem to indicate, then, that in aggregate terms during two rounds of
793“Downsizing” the Chinese State
downsizing the number of people employed by core government has
actually increased. The data are also consistent with the Ministry of
Finance’s data on the number of publicly supported employees, which
from 1993 to 1998 increased from 29.2 million to 37.9 million.45
In 1994 and 1995 the government published data on the number of
employees of some central government agencies (see Table 7). These
data indicate that during this period when the central government was
carrying out overall downsizing, employment in some departments actu-
ally grew. In some cases, this can be explained by the changing functions
of the agencies. As one would expect given the new emphasis on taxation
as a revenue source, the number of tax collectors grew, from 488,845 to
565,557. Other agencies also saw substantial increases, including the
State Economic and Trade Commission (100.7 per cent), the State
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System (20.4 per cent), the
Ministry of Labour (17 per cent), and the Family Planning Commission
(12.9 per cent). Employment in some central government agencies was
cut, however. The largest cuts were made in water conservancy (20.1 per
cent), statistics (11.8 per cent), coal (3.8 per cent) and education (3.6 per
cent).46 The changes may have had less to do with downsizing than with
changing the functions of government, on the one hand, and changing
reporting criteria, on the other (see below). Data for other years for
central government agencies are unavailable.
Aggregate data for official employment in local core governments
indicate that from 1990 to 2000 cuts were made in only eight provinces
(Beijing, Tianjin, Jilin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Yunnan, Qinghai and
Xinjiang) in spite of vigorous downsizing campaigns (see Table 8). For
the rest, aggregate core government employment remained relatively
steady or increased somewhat during the period. What accounts for the
changes in local government staffing levels?
According to the SCPSR, bianzhi levels should be set according to
total population, land area, number of administrative units and a measure
of economic activity (see above). To these may added level of urbaniza-
tion (measured by population density). We have calculated the correla-
tions of these variables with the number of “staff and workers” of
government, Party and social organizations per capita by province from
1990 to 2000 in Table 8. The results are reported in Table 9. The
strongest correlations are for land area and urbanization in China’s poor
provinces which are inversely related to the size of core government. That
is, the largest poor provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang employed more
core government officials per capita, perhaps for public security (politi-
45. Ministry of Finance Budget Bureau (ed.), Quanguo dishixian caizheng tongji ziliao
(Statistical Data on Public Finance of Prefectures, Cities and Counties Throughout the
Country) (Bejing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, various years).
46. State Statistics Bureau and the Ministry of Labour (eds.), Zhongguo laodong tongji
nianjian (China Labour Statistical Yearbook) 1995 and 1996 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 1996 and 1997 respectively), pp. 64 and 83 respectively.
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Table 7: Number of “Staff and Workers” of Selected Central
Government Agencies, 1994–1995
1994 1995 % change
State Economics and Trade Commission 720 1,445 101
State Econ. System Restructuring Commission 397 502 26
State Education Commission 185,469 184,790 0
Civil Affairs 2,140 2,285 7
Justice 8,689 8,685 0
Finance 15,480 15,209 2
Personnel 943 992 5
Labour 2,367 2,771 17
Geology and Mineral Resources 338,525 332,246 2
Construction 26,806 26,417 1
Power Industry 1,587,871 1,600,033 1
Coal Industry 3,406,080 3,276,419 4
Machinery Industry 110,636 108,597 2
Metallurgical Industry 698,713 703,506 1
Chemical Industry 153,065 150,861 1
Railways 3,983,413 3,938,103 1
Communications 452,576 438,668 3
Posts and Telecommunications 1,272,080 1,271,211 0
Water Conservancy 102,557 81,915 20
Agriculture 103,707 103,260 0
Forestry 160,731 167,050 4
Domestic Trade 71,677 67,427 6
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation 152,476 158,524 4
Culture 15,208 14,874 2
Public Health 117,528 118,140 1
State Commission for Sports 14,006 14,635 4
People’s Bank of China 190,148 188,304 1
Auditing Administration 2,744 2,859 4
State Statistical Bureau 14,505 12,791 12
State Administration of Taxation 488,845 565,557 16
Environmental Protection 2,185 2,196 1
Press and Publication Administration 12,977 8,407 35
Tourism Administration 8,406 8,331 1
CAAC 139,958 140,132 0
Source:
State Statistical Bureau and Ministry of Labour, Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian (China
Labour Statistical Yearbook) 1995 and 1996 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996 and
1997), pp. 64–65 and 83–84.
cal) reasons. Urban centres in poor provinces also employed more
government employees, perhaps reflecting government’s role in these
areas as an employer of last resort.
We also found that population size and number of administrative units
were inversely related to the number of local core government employees.
That is, more populous provinces and provinces with more administrative
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units have fewer core government employees per capita than do less
populous provinces and those with fewer administrative units. The central
government’s campaigns during the 1990s to limit the number of local
government employees in spite of population pressure may, therefore,
have had some effect. This result coupled with the finding that (except for
the early 1990s) the level of economic development (measured by GDP
per capita) is unrelated to the size of core government indicates that
considerations other than those identified by the SCPSR play a key role
in actual core government staffing levels. This conclusion is consistent
with an explanation that political factors play a role in local core
government staffing levels.
Case Study: Downsizing of a District Government of City “A”
The case of a district government of a city in northern China (City
“A”) indicates the complexity of the process. While there is some
evidence that during the 1993 to 1996 campaign the district government
shed employees, examples from some bureaus of the district government
indicate that they were able to resist downsizing or that they may have
downsized by shifting workers from one category of publicly-funded
employment to another, resulting in no net loss of jobs. We examine each
of these cases in turn.
According to the district re-organization plan, at the end of 1993 the
district employed 4,997 people in Party, government and mass organiza-
tions at all administrative levels (district, street office, and town and
township).47 Of these, 2,205 were employed by Party, government, and
mass organizations at district level. According to central directives,
municipal, district and street offices were to shed 15.5 per cent of their
personnel in administrative positions in the reforms. The district’s plan
called for a reduction of 20.5 per cent for the district as a whole, most of
which would be accomplished by making cuts at the town and township
levels. Downsizing was also to be accomplished by transferring 589
blue-collar workers to service unit positions, a move that would take them
off the administrative bianzhi and put them in the service unit bianzhi.
The plans called for a one per cent cut at district/street level (from 3,582
to 3,549) and cuts of 48.6 per cent at town and township level (from 826
to 425). The plan indicates that downsizing should have been completed
by the end of May 1995.
Data from 1991 to 2000 for the district government indicate that the
number of civil servants (those holding administrative bianzhi positions)
employed by the district fell gradually from 1992 and flattened out in
1993 and 1994. Major cuts were made from 1994 to 1996 in line with the
plans outlined above (see Figure 1). That is, there is evidence that the cuts
associated with the 1993 to 1996 campaign were made to core govern-
47. This figure included those working in the people’s congress, district-level CPPCC,
mass organizations, and trial district offices and Party committees, but did not include the
district-level courts, procuratorate, public security bureau, state security bureau, people’s
armed police, justice bureau, tax bureau and statistics bureau. Source: “XX qu dangzheng
jigou gaige fang an” (“XX district Party and government restructuring plan”), November
1994.
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Figure 1: Number of Civil Servants Employed by a District Government
in City “A,” 1991–2000
Source:
Interviews, District Government of City “A,” August 2002.
ment positions in this district. Beginning in 1996, however, the district
appeared to have added employees. According to district officials the
increase was more apparent than real. The sharp increase in employees in
1997 and 1998 was the result of reclassifying the employees of urban
management supervisory teams (chengshi guanli jiancha dadui) on the
instructions of the municipal government, an instruction that was later
rescinded. Thus, from 1991 to 2000 the long-term secular trend was
downward. Moreover, the cuts were made at a time when authorities also
had to find jobs for about 200 demobilized soldiers per year in 1999 and
2000.
Further investigation of individual bureaus in the district government
reveals that some bureaus were able to resist downsizing altogether.
According to the district’s re-organization plan for 1993 to 1996, Bureau
1 should have a bianzhi of 38, 34 of which were administrative positions
(civil servants) and the remaining four service unit positions. In fact, from
1992 to 1996 throughout the period of the downsizing campaign the
actual number employed by Bureau 1 did not exceed 34 (see Figure 2).
Still, from 1991 to 2000 the long-term secular trend in this bureau was
basically stable – no downsizing is evident. As we have seen, some
core-government agencies were strengthened in the reforms, which could
explain the case of Bureau 1.
According to the 1993 to 1996 re-organization plan Bureau 2 of the
district government was supposed to have a total bianzhi of 39 positions
(34 administrative and five service unit, probably for blue-collar work-
ers). In addition, the plan authorized the bureau to set up one service unit
employing 20 people. In fact, from 1990 to 1994, the number of
801“Downsizing” the Chinese State
Figure 2: Number of Civil Servants Employed by Bureau 1 of District
Government in City “A,” 1991–2000
Source:
Interviews, District Government of City “A,” June 2002.
employees holding administrative posts in the bureau remained in the
range of 34 to 37 (see Figure 3). From 1995 to 1996, however, reflecting
the impact of the downsizing campaign, the number of employees was cut
from 37 to 30, a decline of about 19 per cent, in line with the official
target. The bureau continued to employ 30 administrative staff (except in
the year 2000) throughout the rest of the period.
While the number of administrative employees was cut to conform to
the downsizing campaign, authorities increased the number of employees
of publicly funded service units beginning in 1996. Indeed from 1996 to
2000 they steadily increased from 17 to 29, an increase of 70.6 per cent.
Thus, for the bureau as a whole over the ten-year period the total number
of publicly-funded employees actually increased. This case illustrates
how authorities can claim downsizing successes (for the administrative
bianzhi) in spite of overall increases in publicly funded employment.
The case of a district government in City “A” indicates the complexity
of the question of determining the extent to which downsizing has
actually occurred. Although the district government as a whole success-
fully cut the number of its core government administrative employees,
these employees may not actually have left the public payroll. The case
helps to explain the aggregate data, discussed above, in which the number
of employees of guojia jiguan steadily increased during the 1990s in spite
of two vigorous downsizing campaigns. That is, although officials left
their administrative bianzhi positions they may have been transferred to
service unit positions in the same core government agencies. Data from
the central government and local level present a more mixed picture. Our
case study is representative of the complexity found on the ground. In
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Figure 3: Number of Civil Servants Employed by Bureau 2 of District
Government in City “A,” 1990–2001
Source:
Interviews, District Government of City “A,” June 2002.
particular, the case study indicates the important role that the CCP now
places on service units to provide official employment.
Conclusion
The Chinese government’s admonition that “the bianzhi is the law” has
turned out to be true. Just as the law is widely flouted so too are bianzhi
ceilings, especially it would seem by local governments in poorer areas
where government operates as an employer of last resort. The CCP
continues to maintain control over the bianzhi system because of its
importance for Party patronage and social stability. Fundamentally
conflicted, the CCP needs both to maintain as many official positions as
possible and to cut positions for the sake of the economy. Aggregate data
indicate that downsizing campaigns have not been particularly successful.
Given the Party’s mixed motives these results should not be surprising.
